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Abstract
We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games
of m (m ≥ 2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one of the m
servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the workload of
the server it chooses.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile that is resilient to uni-
lateral deviations. Finding an NE in such a game is simple. However,
an NE assignment is not stable against coordinated deviations of several
jobs, while a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is. We study how well an
NE approximates an SNE.
Given any job assignment in a load balancing game, the improvement
ratio (IR) of a deviation of a job is defined as the ratio between the pre-
and post-deviation costs. An NE is said to be a ρ-approximate SNE
(ρ ≥ 1) if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition
will have an IR more than ρ from coordinated deviations of the coalition.
While it is already known that NEs are the same as SNEs in the 2-
server load balancing game, we prove that, in the m-server load balancing
game for any given m ≥ 3, any NE is a (5/4)-approximate SNE, which
together with the lower bound already established in the literature yields
a tight approximation bound. This closes the final gap in the literature
on the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs in load balancing
games. To establish our upper bound, we make a novel use of a graph-
theoretic tool.
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1 Introduction
In game theory, a fundamental notion is Nash equilibrium (NE), which is a
state that is stable against deviations of any individual participants (known as
agents) of the game in the sense that any such deviation will not bring about
additional benefit to the deviator. Much stronger stability is exhibited by a
strong Nash equilibrium (SNE), a notion introduced by Aumann [3], at which
no coalition of agents exists such that each member of the coalition can benefit
from coordinated deviations by the members of the coalition.
Evidentally selfish individual agents stand to benefit from cooperation and
hence SNEs are much more preferred to NEs for stability. However, SNEs do
not necessarily exist [2] and, even if they do, they are much more difficult to
identify and to compute [7, 4]. It is therefore very much desirable to have the ad-
vantages of both computational efficiency and strong stability, which motivates
our study in this paper. We establish that, for general NE job assignments in
load balancing games, which exist and are easy to compute, their loss of strong
stability possessed by SNEs is at most 25%.
In a load balancing game, there are n selfish agents, each representing one
of a set J = {J1, · · · , Jn} of n jobs. In the absence of a coordinating authority,
each agent must choose one of m identical servers, M = {1, . . . ,m}, to assign his
job to in order to complete the job as soon as possible. All jobs assigned to the
same server will finish at the same time, which is determined by the workload
of the server, defined to be the total processing time of the jobs assigned to the
server. Let job Jj have a processing time pj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) and let Si denote
the set of jobs assigned to server i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). For convenience, we will use
“agent” and “job” interchangeably, and consider job processing times also as
their “lengths”. The completion time cj of job Jj ∈ Si is the workload of its
server: Li =
∑
Jj∈Si pj .
The notions of NE and SNE can be stated more specifically for the load
balancing game. A job assignment S = (S1, . . . , Sm) is said to be an NE if
no individual job Jj ∈ Si can reduce its completion time cj by unilaterally
migrating from server i to another server. A job assignment S = (S1, . . . , Sm) is
said to be an SNE if no subset Γ ⊆ J of jobs can each reduce their job completion
times by forming a coalition and making coordinated migrations from their own
current servers.
NEs in the load balancing game have been widely studied (see, e.g., [8, 11, 6,
10, 5]) with the main focus of quantifying their loss of global optimality in terms
of the price of anarchy, a term coined by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [11],
as largely summarized in [12]. In this paper, we study NEs in load balancing
games from a different perspective by quantifying their loss of strong stability.
We focus on pure NEs, those corresponding to deterministic job assignments
in load balancing games. While high-quality NEs are easily computed, identifi-
cation of an SNE is strongly NP-hard [4]. Given any job assignment in a load
balancing game, the improvement ratio (IR) of a deviation of a job is defined
as the ratio between the pre- and post-deviation costs. An NE is said to be a
ρ-approximate SNE (ρ ≥ 1) (which is called ρ-SE in [1]) if there is no coalition
of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have an IR more than ρ from
coordinated deviations of the coalition. Clearly, the stability of NE improves
with a decreasing value of ρ and a 1-approximate SNE is in fact an SNE itself.
For the load balancing game of two servers, one can easily verify that every
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NE is also an SNE [2]. If there are three or four servers in the game, then
it is proved in [7] and [4], respectively, that any NE assignment is a (5/4)-
approximate SNE, and the bound is tight. Furthermore, it is a (2− 2/(m+ 1))-
approximate SNE if the game has m servers for m ≥ 5 [7].
We establish in this paper that, in them-server load balancing game (m ≥ 3),
any NE is a (5/4)-approximate SNE, which is tight and hence closes the final
gap in the literature on the study of NE approximation of SNE in load balancing
games. To establish our approximation bound, we make a novel use of a powerful
graph-theoretic tool.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
2.1 A Lower Bound
We start with an example to help the reader get some intuition of the problem
under consideration. The example also provides a lower bound of 5/4 for any
NE assignment to approximate SNE. The left panel of Fig. 1 below shows an
NE assignment of six jobs to three identical machines with job completions 5,
5 and 10, respectively, for the three pairs of jobs. If the four jobs of lengths 2
and 5 form a coalition and make a coordinated deviation as shown in the figure,
then in the resulting assignment, each of the four jobs in the coalition achieves
an improvement ratio of 5/4.
 
Figure 1: An Instance for Lower Bound
2.2 Graph-theoretic Tool [4]
As a tool of our analysis, we start with the minimal deviation graph intro-
duced by Chen [4]. For convenience we collect into this subsection some basic
results on minimal deviation graphs from [4]. Given an NE job assignment
S = (S1, . . . , Sm), as an NE-based coalitional deviation or simply coalitional
deviation ∆, we refer to a collective action of a subset Γ ⊆ J of jobs in which
each job of Γ migrates from its server in the assignment S so that its completion
time is decreased after the migration. Accordingly, Γ = Γ(∆) is called the cor-
responding coalition. We introduce deviation graphs to characterize coalitional
deviations. In a coalitional deviation, a server i is said to be participating or
involved if its job set changes after the deviation. Given a coalitional devia-
tion ∆ with the corresponding coalition Γ = Γ(∆), we define the corresponding
(directed) deviation graph G(∆) = (V,A) as follows:
V = V (G) := {i : server i is a participating server};
A = A(G) := {(u, v) : a job Jj ∈ Γ migrates from Su to Sv}.
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In what follows, without loss of generality we consider coalitional deviations
with V (G) = M . Given a coalitional deviation ∆, we denote by L′i = Li(∆)
the workload of server i after deviation ∆, and by IR(∆) the minimum of the
improvement ratios of all jobs taking part in ∆. Then we have the following
definition and lemmas from [4]:
Lemma 1 The out-degree δ+(i) of any node i of a deviation graph is at least
1, and hence |Si| ≥ 2.
Lemma 2 If all m servers are involved in a coalitional deviation, then the
deviation graph does not contain a set of node-disjoint directed cycles such that
each node of the graph is in one of the directed cycles.
Definition 1 Let ∆ be a coalitional deviation and Γ = Γ(∆) be the correspond-
ing coalition. Deviation graph G = G(∆) is said to be minimal if IR(∆′) <
IR(∆) for any coalitional deviation ∆′ such that the corresponding coalition
Γ′ = Γ′(∆′) is a proper subset of Γ.
Lemma 3 The in-degree δ−(i) of any node i of a minimal deviation graph is
at least 1.
Lemma 4 A minimal deviation graph is strongly connected.
2.3 Some Observations
In our study of bounding NE approximation of SNE, we can apparently focus
on those coalitional deviations that correspond to minimal deviation graphs.
We start with several observations on any NE-based coalitional deviation ∆
involving m servers for m ≥ 3. Let G(∆) denote the corresponding minimal
deviation graph.
If two jobs assigned to server i ∈M in the NE assignment migrate to server
j ∈ M (j 6= i) together, or both stay on the server, then we can treat them as
one single job without loss of generality in our study of the minimal deviation
graph. With this understanding, if we let ai (i ∈M) denote the number of jobs
assigned to server i in the NE assignment, then the following is immediate.
Observation 1 For any i ∈ M , we have 2 ≤ ai ≤ m. δ+(i) = ai or δ+(i) =
ai − 1.
As a result of the above observation, the node set M can be partitioned into
two, M ′ and M ′′, as follows:
M ′ := {i ∈M : ai = δ+(i)},
M ′′ := M\M ′ = {i ∈M : ai = δ+(i) + 1}.
By applying a data scaling if necessary, we assume without loss of generality
that
min
i∈M
Li = 1. (1)
Observation 2 For any i ∈M , we have Li ≤ ai/(ai − 1).
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Li > ai/(ai − 1), which implies that ai >
Li/(Li − 1).
Let xi denote the length of the shortest job assigned to server i in the NE
assignment. We have Li ≥ aixi, which leads to Li > Lixi/(Li − 1), that is,
Li > xi + 1, which implies that the shortest job assigned to server i in the
NE assignment can have the benefit of reducing its job completion time by
unilaterally migrating to the server of which the workload is 1, contradicting
the NE property. 
The following observation states that, if all jobs on a server participate in
the migration, then none of the servers they migrate to will have all its jobs
migrate out.
Observation 3 If (i, j) ∈ A and i ∈M ′, then j ∈M ′′.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that aj 6= δ+(j)+1. According to Observation 1,
we have aj = δ
+(j), which implies that all the jobs assigned to server i and server
j in the NE assignment belong to coalition Γ.
Since (i, j) ∈ A, there is a job Jk ∈ Γ that migrates from server i to server j.
Consider the new coalition Γ′ formed by all members of Γ except Jk. Then we
have ∅ 6= Γ′ ⊂ Γ. Let ∆′ be such a coalitional deviation of Γ′ that is the same
as ∆ except without the involvement of Jk and the job(s) that migrate(s) to i
(resp. j) in ∆ will migrate to j (resp. i) in ∆′. Then we have IR(∆′) = IR(∆),
contradicting the minimality of the deviation graph G according to Definition 1.

The following observation is a direct consequence of Observation 3:
Observation 4 Assume i, j ∈ M ′. Hence (i, j), (j, i) 6∈ A according to Obser-
vation 3. Let ∆′ be the same as ∆ except that any job that migrates to i (resp. j)
in ∆ will migrate to j (resp. i) in ∆′. Then IR(∆′) = IR(∆), and G(∆′) is also
minimal.
3 A Key Inequality
To help our analysis, we will introduce in this section a special arc set A˜ ⊆ A
in the minimal deviation graph G(∆).
3.1 Auxiliary Arc Set A˜
For any node i ∈ M , denote Q+(i) := {j ∈ M : (i, j) ∈ A} and Q−(i) :=
{j ∈ M : (j, i) ∈ A}. For notational convenience, for any node set S ⊆ M , we
denote Q+(S) :=
⋃
i∈S Q
+(i) and Q−(S) :=
⋃
i∈S Q
−(i). With A replaced by
A˜ above, we similarly define Q˜+(i), Q˜−(i), Q˜+(S) and Q˜−(S).
Let us define A˜ as follows. According to Lemma 3, |Q−(i)| ≥ 1 for any
i ∈ M . For each i ∈ M we pick up an arc from the non-empty set Q−(i) to
form an m-element subset A˜ ⊆ A. Then A˜ possesses the following property:
|Q˜−(i)| = 1 for any i ∈M. (2)
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Denote bi := |Q˜+(i)| for any i ∈M . Then it is clear that
m∑
i=1
bi = |A˜| = m. (3)
If node set S is a singleton, then we will also use S to denote the singleton
if no confusion can arise. Hence, due to (2) we will also use Q˜−(i) to denote
the single element of the corresponding set. Any arc set A˜ ⊆ A that possesses
property (2) is said to be tilde-valid.
3.2 Main Result
Our main result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any minimal deviation graph G(∆m) involving m servers, its
improvement ratio IR(∆m) ≤ 5/4.
Let us perform some initial investigation to see what we need to do to prove
the theorem. Recall that, for any i ∈ M , ai is the number of jobs assigned to
server i in the NE assignment and bi = |Q˜+(i)| for a fixed arc set A˜ defined in
Section 3.1 for the minimal deviation graph G(∆m). For a pair of integers a
and b with 2 ≤ a ≤ m and 0 ≤ b ≤ a, let M ba := {i ∈M : ai = a, bi = b}. Then
it is clear that ⋃
2≤a≤m
⋃
0≤b≤a
M ba = M. (4)
Denote mba = |M ba| for all possible pairs a and b: 2 ≤ a ≤ m and 0 ≤ b ≤ a. Let
r = IR(∆m). Then according to (2) and (4), we have
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=0
mba = m, and
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=0
bmba = m. (5)
According to the definition of IR, we have rL′j ≤ Li for (i, j) ∈ A. Summing up
these inequalities over all m arcs in A˜ leads to
m∑
j=1
rL′j ≤
m∑
i=1
biLi,
which implies that
r ≤
m∑
i=1
biLi
m∑
i=1
Li
. (6)
According to Observation 2, we have Li ≤ ai/(ai − 1) ≤ 2, which implies that
the right-hand side of (6), which we denote by R, is at most 2, since R is a
convex combination of L1, . . . , Lm and 0 with the corresponding combination
coefficients λi = bi/
∑m
k=1 Lk (i = 1, . . . ,m) and λm+1 = 1 −m/
∑m
k=1 Lk ≥ 0
due to (1) and (3). On the other hand, since r ≥ 1 according to the definition,
we conclude that 1 ≤ R ≤ 2, which implies that R is a decreasing function
of Li for which bi = 0 or bi = 1, and an increasing function of Li for which
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bi ≥ 2. Therefore, we increase R by increasing Li to ai/(ai − 1) for i such that
bi ≥ 2, and by decreasing Li to 1 for i such that bi = 0 or bi = 1. Noticing that
2 ≤ ai ≤ m according to Observation 1, we obtain
r ≤
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
ab
a−1m
b
a +
m∑
a=2
m1a
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
a
a−1m
b
a +
m∑
a=2
m1a +
m∑
a=2
m0a
,
which together with (5) implies that
r ≤
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
b
a−1m
b
a +m
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
1
a−1m
b
a +m
.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to show r ≤ 5/4. Then it suffices to show
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
b
a−1m
b
a +m
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
1
a−1m
b
a +m
≤ 5
4
,
which is equivalent to
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
4b− 5
a− 1 m
b
a ≤ m.
By replacing the right-hand side m of the above inequality with the left-hand
side of the second equality in (5), we have
0 ≤
m∑
a=2
m1a +
m∑
a=2
a∑
b=2
(
b− 4b− 5
a− 1
)
mba,
that is
m22 +
1
2
m33 ≤
m∑
a=2
m1a +
1
2
m23 +
m∑
a=4
a∑
b=2
(
b− 4b− 5
a− 1
)
mba. (7)
In what follows, we are to prove (7) and thereby Theorem 1 through a series
of lower bounds established in Section 5 on different terms of the right-hand
side of inequality (7).
4 Preparations
We introduce an auxiliary node set W in addition to the auxiliary arc set A˜
introduced earlier.
4.1 Auxiliary Node Set W
Let
W0 := {i ∈M : bi = 0}.
Then we immediately have
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Lemma 5 W0 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that W0 = ∅. Then any bi ≥ 1 in (3), which
implies that bi = 1 for any i ∈M , so that A˜ forms some node-disjoint directed
cycles that span all nodes, contradicting Lemma 2. 
Note that, from the formation of arc set A˜, it is clear that A˜ as a tilde-valid
arc set may not be unique. However, among all possible choices of a tilde-valid
arc set A˜ ⊆ A, we choose one that has some additional properties in terms of
minimum cardinalities of some combinatorial structures, which we shall define in
due course. These additional properties will be presented in a sequence of three
assumptions, which are made without loss of generality due to the finiteness of
the total number of tilde-valid arc sets. With the same reason, we assume that
our coalitional deviation ∆ is chosen in such a way that it has a certain property
(see Assumption 4).
Assumption 1 Arc set A˜ is tilde-valid and it minimizes |W0(A˜)|.
Let W˜0 = Q
+(W0). Then W˜0 6= ∅ according to Lemmas 5 and 1. A node
i ∈ M is said to be associated with W0 if it is linked to an element of W˜0
through a sequence of arcs (but not a directed path) in A˜ and A in alternation
(see Fig. 2 for an illustration). More formally, i ∈ M is associated with W0 if
and only if, for some integer k ≥ 0, there are nodes {i0, . . . , ik, j0, . . . , jk} ⊆M
with i = ik and j0 ∈ W˜0, such that
(i0, j0), . . . , (ik, jk) ∈ A˜ and (i0, j1), . . . , (ik−1, jk) ∈ A. (8)
NB: the solid arcs belong to A˜ and dotted arcs to A
1j
1ki 2ki 。 。 。1i0i ki i

0 0j W kj。 。 。 1kj 2j
Figure 2: Definition of Node Set W1
Note that in the above definition, if i = ik is associated with W0, then i0, . . . ,
ik−1 used in (8) are each associated with W0. Define
W1 := {i ∈M : node i is associated with W0},
W˜1 := Q˜
+(W1).
Immediately we have Q˜−(W˜0) ⊆W1, which implies that
W˜0 ⊆ W˜1. (9)
On the other hand, since Q˜−(W˜0) 6= ∅ according to (2), we have W1 6= ∅.
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Lemma 6 For any i ∈W1, bi = 1. Furthermore, Q+(W0 ∪W1) = W˜1.
Proof. It is clear from the definition that W1 ∩W0 = ∅. Hence bi ≥ 1 for any
i ∈ W1. Assume for contradiction that bi ≥ 2 for some i ∈ W1. Since i is
associated with W0, in addition to nodes {i0, . . . , ik, j0, . . . , jk} ⊆ M satisfying
(8), we have a node h ∈ W0 (hence h 6∈ {i0, . . . , ik}) such that (h, j0) ∈ A
according to the definition of W˜0. Now we remove k+ 1 arcs (i0, j0), . . . , (ik, jk)
from A˜ and add k + 1 new arcs (h, j0), (i0, j1), . . . , (ik−1, jk) to A˜. It is easy to
see that the new set A˜ still has property (2). Additionally, under the new A˜, all
{bk} remain the same except two of them: bh and bi, with the former increased
by 1 and the latter decreased by 1. Since bi ≥ 2 under the original A˜, then
i 6∈ W0 under the new A˜. Consequently, the new W0 determined by the new A˜
contains a smaller number of elements, contradicting Assumption 1 about the
original A˜.
To prove the second part of the lemma, let us first prove Q+(W1) ⊆ W˜1.
Let i ∈ W1 and (i, j) ∈ A. We show that j ∈ W˜1. In fact, since |Q˜−(j)| = 1
according to (2), we have a node h ∈ M such that (h, j) ∈ A˜. Now since i is
associated with W0, we conclude that h is also associated with W0, which implies
that j ∈ W˜1. Therefore, with (9) we have proved that Q+(W0 ∪W1) ⊆ W˜1.
The other direction of the inclusion is apparent. 
It follows from Lemma 6 and (2) that the mapping Q˜+(·) from W1 onto W˜1
is a one-to-one correspondence and hence
|W1| = |W˜1| > 0. (10)
Let
W := W0 ∪W1 ∪ W˜1.
4.2 Notation
As we can see from inequality (7), bounding the sizes m22 and m
3
3 of the respec-
tive sets M22 and M
3
3 is vital in our establishment of the desired bound. We
therefore take a close look at the two sets by partitioning
X := M22 ∪M33
into a number of subsets, so that different bounding arguments can be applied
to different subsets.
We assemble our notations here in one place for easy reference and the reader
is advised to conceptualize each only when it is needed in an analysis at a later
point.
Let M˜22 := {` ∈ M22 : Q˜+(`) * W}. For convenience, we reserve letter ` to
exclusively index elements of M˜22 and let Q˜
+(`) = {`1, `2} with the understand-
ing that it is always the case that `1 /∈ W . For any ` ∈ M˜22 , `1 /∈ W implies
b`1 ≥ 1 since W0 ⊆ W . On the other hand, since arc (`, `1) ∈ A˜ ⊆ A, we have
a`1 = δ
+(`1) + 1 ≥ b`1 + 1 according to Observation 3, which implies that `1
must belong to one of the following three mutually disjoint node sets:
Z1 := {i ∈M\W : bi = 1},
Z2 := {i ∈M\W : bi > 1, ai > bi + 1},
Z := {i ∈M\W : bi > 1, ai = bi + 1}.
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Therefore, if we define
X2 := {i ∈M33 : Q˜+(i) *W};
X3 := {` ∈ M˜22 : Q˜+(`) ∩W = ∅};
X4 := {` ∈ M˜22 \X3 : `1 ∈ Z1 ∪ Z2};
X5 := {` ∈ M˜22 \X3 : `1 ∈ Z,Q+(`1) *W, δ−(`1) > 1};
X6 := {` ∈ M˜22 \X3 : `1 ∈ Z,Q+(`1) *W, δ−(`1) = 1};
then we have
X11 := M˜
2
2 \
⋃6
k=3Xk = {` ∈ M˜22 \X3 : `1 ∈ Z,Q+(`1) ⊆W},
and
|Q˜+(`) ∩W | = |Q˜+(`)\W | = 1 (11)
for any ` ∈ M˜22 \X3 = X4 ∪ X5 ∪ X6 ∪ X11. In other words, for any element
` ∈ M˜22 \X3, the two-element set Q˜+(`) has exactly one element in W . Now let
X1 := {i ∈ X : Q˜+(i) ⊆W} ∪X11.
Clearly, Xi ∩Xj = ∅ (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 6) and X =
⋃6
k=1Xk.
5 Proving Upper Bounds
To bound from below the right-hand side of the key inequality (7), or equiv-
alently, to bound from above the left-hand side of (7), we establish through
a series of five lemmas and a corollary that the number of nodes in Xt is at
most ct|Yt|, where ct ∈ {1, 12} and Yt are defined below for t = 1, . . . , 6 with
Y1, . . . , Y6 ⊆ M\X mutually disjoint node sets. We divide our proofs into two
parts with the second part on bounding |X6|.
5.1 Part 1
Let us start with some straightforward upper bounds. Since Q˜+(i)\W 6= ∅ for
any i ∈ X2 according to the definition of X2, we immediately have the following
lemma thanks to Observation 3.
Lemma 7 Let Y2 :=
⋃
i∈X2 Q˜
+(i)\W . Then Y2 ⊆M ′′\W and |X2| ≤ |Y2|. 
Note that |Q˜+(`)| = 2 for any ` ∈ X3 and Q˜+(i)∩ Q˜+(j) = ∅ (i 6= j) due to
(2), which lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Let Y3 :=
⋃
`∈X3 Q˜
+(`). Then Y3 ⊆M ′′\W and 2|X3| ≤ |Y3|. 
The following lemma follows directly from the definition of X4:
Lemma 9 Let Y4 :=
⋃
`∈X4 Q˜
+(`)\W . Then Y4 ⊆ M ′′\W and |X4| ≤ |Y4|.
For any j ∈ Y4, bj > 1 and aj > bj + 1, unless bj = 1. 
At this point, we introduce our second additional assumption about A˜ with-
out loss of generality.
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Assumption 2 Arc set A˜ is such that it first satisfies Assumption 1 and then
minimizes |M22 (A˜)|.
For any ` ∈ X5, since δ−(`1) > 1 according to the definition of X5, there is
j ∈ Q−(`1)\{`}. Then j /∈W0∪W1 (otherwise we would have `1 ∈W according
to Lemma 6). In fact, node j has the following property:
j ∈M12 ∩M ′\W. (12)
To see this, consider replacing (`, `1) with (j, `1) in A˜ to form a new tilde-valid
arc set A˜′. It is easy to see that A˜′ satisfies Assumption 1. However, with the
new arc set A˜′, ` is no longer a node in the new M22 (A˜
′), which implies that j
has to become a node in M22 (A˜
′) in order not to contradict Assumption 2 with
the original choice of A˜, which in turn implies properties (12). Furthermore,
since j ∈ M12 and (j, `1) ∈ A\A˜, there is no k 6= `1 such that (j, k) ∈ A\A˜,
which implies that j /∈ Q−1(Q˜+(`′)\)\{`′}. Consequently, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 10 Let Y5 :=
⋃
`∈X5 Q
−(Q˜+(`)\W )\{`}. Then Y5 ⊆M12 ∩M ′\W and
|X5| ≤ |Y5|. 
Now let us establish an upper bound on |X1| in the following lemma with
the minimality of our deviation graph G(∆).
Lemma 11 Let Y1 := W1. Then |X1| ≤ |Y1|.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that |X1| > |W1|, that is, |X1| > |W1| = |W˜1|
according to (10). Let X ′1  X1 be a proper subset of |W˜1| > 0 elements. Define
K := W\W˜1 ⊆W0 ∪W1,
K ′ := Q+(X ′1)\W,
Γ′ := {Jj ∈ Γ : Jj ∈
⋃
i∈M˜ Si},
where M˜ := X ′1 ∪ K ∪ K ′ (see Fig. 3 for an illustration with explanations to
follow).
 
 
 
   
  
  
K 
W0 ∪ W1 
X11′ 
K ′ 
X
1
' 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑋1\𝑋1′ 
Figure 3: Proof of Lemma 11
Then Γ′ 6= ∅ since X ′1 6= ∅. We claim Γ′ is a proper subset of Γ. To see
this, let i ∈ X1\X ′1 6= ∅. Since X ∩ (W0 ∪W1) = ∅ (Lemma 6), we have i /∈ K.
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Observation 3 implies i /∈ K ′. Therefore, we have i /∈ M˜ , i.e., Si ∩ Γ′ = ∅, but
Si ⊆ Γ. With the same arguments we note that the three constituent subsets
of M˜ are mutually disjoint. In Fig. 3, the set X11
′ is a subset of X11 according
to the definition of X1 and the mapping between X11
′ and K ′ is a one-to-one
correspondence due to equation (11).
Since |X ′1| = |W˜1|, we can assume there is a one-to-one correspondence φ
between the nodes (i.e., servers) of the two sets X ′1 and W˜1. Now let us define a
new coalitional deviation ∆′ with Γ′ = Γ′(∆′), which is the same as ∆ restricted
on Γ′ except that, if Jj ∈ Γ′ migrates in ∆ to a server of W˜1, then let Jj migrate
in ∆′ to the corresponding (under φ) server of X ′1.
We show that the improvement ratio of any job deviation in ∆′ is at least the
same as that in ∆, which then implies that IR(∆′) ≥ IR(∆), contradicting the
minimality of G = G(∆) according to Definition 1. To this end, we only need
to show that the new coalitional deviation ∆′ takes place among the servers
assigned with jobs of the coalition Γ′, that is,
Q+(M˜) ⊆W ∪K ′ = W˜1 ∪K ∪K ′, (13)
so that benefit of any job deviation will not decrease due to the fact that all
jobs on servers of X ′1 migrate out in ∆ and hence in ∆
′ as well, leaving empty
space for deviational jobs under ∆′, which originally migrate to servers of W˜1
under ∆.
First we have Q+(K) ⊆ W˜1 according to Lemma 6. On the other hand, it
can be easily verified that Q+(X ′1) ⊆W
⋃
K ′ according to the definition of K ′.
Now we show Q+(K ′) ⊆ W , which then implies (13). In fact, for any k ∈ K ′,
noticing that X ′1 ⊆ X1, according to the definitions of K ′ and X1, we have
k ∈ Q+(X11)\W , which implies that Q+(k) ∈ W according to the definition of
X11. 
5.2 Part 2
To prove our final upper bound, we need to introduce the following two struc-
tures in graph G(∆) with tilde-valid arc set A˜:
Ω(A˜) := {i ∈M ′ : i1 = Q˜−1(i) ∈ Q˜+(i),
δ−(i1) = 1, δ+(i1) = bi1 > 1};
Π(A˜) := {(i, i1, j) : i ∈ M˜22 \X3, i1 ∈ Q˜+(`) ∩ Q˜−(j)\W,
i 6= j, δ−(i1) = 1, δ+(i1) = bi1 > 1, j ∈M ′}.
Note that each element in Ω(A˜) represents a directed 2-cycles of both arcs in A˜
and each element in Π(A˜) is a directed 2-path of both arcs in A˜. In both cases
of Ω(A˜) and Π(A˜), the interior node i1 has an in-degree δ
−(i1) = 1 and all its
out-arcs are in A˜. Our next result is based on the following further refinement
of the tilde-valid arc set A˜.
Lemma 12 If Ω(A˜) 6= ∅ for some arc set A˜ satisfying Assumption 2, then there
exists an arc set A˜′ such that, while it also satisfies Assumption 2, additionally,
Ω(A˜′) is a proper subset of Ω(A˜).
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Proof. Assume i ∈ Ω(A˜) and let i1 = Q˜−1(i) be as in the definition of Ω(A˜).
Then there must be a node h ∈ Q−(i) with h 6= i1, since otherwise δ−(i) =
δ−(i1) = 1, which implies that there would be no directed path from any other
nodes in G(∆) to nodes i or i1, contradicting Lemma 4. Therefore, the following
set is not empty:
Hi := {h ∈M : (h, i) ∈ A, either δ−(h) > 1 or (h, i) /∈ A˜}. (14)
Let h ∈ Hi 6= ∅. We define a new tilde-valid arc set
A˜′ := {A˜\{(i1, i)}} ∪ {(h, i)}. (15)
It is easily seen that i ∈ Ω(A˜)\Ω(A˜′) and Ω(A˜′) ∪ {i} = Ω(A˜). On the other
hand, A˜′ still satisfies Assumption 1 due to bi1 > 1, and hence also satisfies
Assumption 2 since δ+(h) < ah (which implies that h /∈ Ω(A˜)∪Ω(A˜′)) according
to Observation 3 (as no other node not in M22 (A˜) can possibly become a member
of M22 (A˜
′)). 
As a result of Lemma 12, we can further refine our initial choice of A˜ so that
it satisfies the following assumption, where the benefit of minimizing |Π(A˜)| will
be seen in the proof of Lemma 14 (see inequality (16)).
Assumption 3 Arc set A˜ is such that it first satisfies Assumption 2 and then
lexicographically minimizes (|Ω(A˜)|, |Π(A˜)|).
Corollary 13 Any arc set A˜ satisfying Assumption 3 must satisfy Ω(A˜) = ∅.

An arc set A˜ in graph G(∆) that satisfies Assumption 3 is said to be derived
from ∆. Without loss of generality, our coalitional deviation ∆ is considered to
have been chosen so that it satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 4 Coalitional deviation ∆ defining minimal deviation graph G(∆)
is such that the arc set A˜ derived from ∆ gives lexicographical minimum V (∆) :=
(|W0(A˜)|, |M22 (A˜)|, |Ω(A˜)|, |Π(A˜)|).
Lemma 14 Let minimal deviation graph G(∆) with ∆ satisfying Assumption 4
be given. For any ` ∈ X6, there is j 6= `, such that Q˜−1(j) = Q˜+(`)\W (note
(11)) and j ∈M ′′\W .
Proof. Given ` ∈ X6 and `1 = Q+(`)\W . Since a`1 = b`1 + 1 according to
the definition of X6, we have δ
+(`1) = b`1 and hence Q˜
+(`1) = Q
+(`1) since
a`1 = δ
+(`1) + 1 according to Observation 3. Since b`1 > 1 and Q˜
+(`1) =
Q+(`1) 6⊆ W (again according to the definition of X6), we let j ∈ Q˜+(`1)\W .
Then j 6= ` since otherwise we would have ` ∈ Ω(A˜), contracting Corollary 13
with our Assumption 3 (see Fig. 4 for an illustration with more explanations to
follow).
We claim j ∈M ′′ and hence are done. Let us assume for a contradiction that
j ∈M ′. Note that with {`, `1, j} replacing {i, i1, j} in the definition of Π(A˜), we
conclude that ` ∈ Π(A˜). Now let us define a new coalitional deviation ∆′ so that
its derived arc set A˜′ gives a µ(∆′) := (|W0(A˜′)|, |M22 (A˜′)|, |Ω(A˜′)|, |Π(A˜′)|) that
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ℓ ∈ 𝑋6 
 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑀′′\𝑊 
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Figure 4: A Company Node j of ` ∈ X6 or New Coalitional Deviation ∆′
is lexicographically smaller than µ(∆) := (|W0(A˜)|, |M22 (A˜)|, |Ω(A˜)|, |Π(A˜)|), a
desired contraction to Assumption 4.
In fact, let ∆′ be defined as in Observation 4 after node i has been replaced
by ` in the statement of Observation 4. Denote A′ as the arc set of the resulting
minimal deviation graph G(∆′). Let A˜′ be the natural result of A˜ after the re-
orientation from ∆ and ∆′, i.e., an arc in A˜ pointing to ` (resp. j) will become
an arc in A˜′ pointing to j (resp. `). Other arcs are the same for A˜ and A˜′.
Apparently,
|W0(A˜′)| = |W0(A˜)|, |M22 (A˜′)| = |M22 (A˜)|.
On the other hand, if the value of |Ω(A˜′)| has increased from |Ω(A˜)|, then clearly
it must be the result of ` and/or j becoming element(s) of Ω(A˜′). In any such
case (say, the former case for the sake of argument), based on the definition
of Ω(A˜′), we can use the approach in Lemma 12 to find h ∈ H` as defined
in (14) and perform an arc-swap as in (15) with i and i1 replaced by ` and
`1, respectively, to reduce |Ω(A˜′)| while maintaining the values of |W0(A˜′)| and
|M22 (A˜′)|. For convenience, we still use A˜′ to denote the tilde-valid arc set after
such arc-swap(s) if needed. Consequently, we have
Ω(A˜′) = Ω(A˜) = ∅.
However, we claim
|Π(A˜′)| < |Π(A˜)|, (16)
a desired contradiction. To see inequality (16), we first note that (i) any 2-path
in Π(A˜) starting at i 6= `, j is also a 2-path in Π(A˜′), and vice versa, and (ii)
any 2-path in Π(A˜) (resp. Π(A˜′)) starting at ` (resp. j) must have the first arc
(`, `1) (resp. (j, Q˜
+(j)\W ), since |Q˜+(j)\W | = 1 due to j ∈ M˜22 \X3 according
to (11)). On the other hand, the following can be easily observed:
1. If (`, `1, j
′) ∈ Π(A˜) (j′ 6= j), then (`, `1, j′) ∈ Π(A˜′), and vice versa.
2. If (j, j1, j
′) ∈ Π(A˜) (j′ 6= `), then (j, j1, j′) ∈ Π(A˜′), and vice versa.
3. (`, `1, j) ∈ Π(A˜)\Π(A˜′), since (`, `1, j) ∈ Π(A˜′) would imply (`1, j) ∈ A˜′ ⊆
A′ by definition of Π(A˜′) and hence (`1, `) ∈ A by definition of A′, which
in turn implies that (`1, `) ∈ A˜ since b`1 = δ+(`1) under A˜. Consequently,
we obtain ` ∈ Ω(A˜), contradicting Corollary 13.
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4. With similar reasons for (`, `1, j) 6∈ Π(A˜′), we have (j, j1, `) 6∈ Π(A˜′).
Therefore, overall Π(A˜′) contains at least one element less than Π(A˜) as indi-
cated in points 3 and 4 above. 
We call j ∈ M ′′\W identified in the above lemma a company of ` ∈ X6.
Clearly, any j ∈ M ′′\W cannot be a company of two different elements of
X6 according to the statement of the lemma, which leads us to the following
corollary.
Corollary 15 Denote X[`] := {j ∈M\X : node j is a company of `} for any
` ∈ X6 and let Y6 :=
⋃
`∈X6((Q˜
+(`)\W ) ∪ X[`]). Then Y6 ⊆ M ′′\W and
2|X6| ≤ |Y6|. 
We have used the cardinalities of the six sets Y1, . . . , Y6 to bound |X1|, |X2|,
2|X3|, |X4|, |X5| and 2|X6|, respectively. Let us make sure these sets do not
overlap with X and are mutually disjoint. According to Lemmas 7–10 and
Corollary 15, we have
Y5 ⊆M12 ∩M ′\W ⊆M\X;
Y2, Y3, Y4, Y6 ⊆M ′′\W ⊆M\X;
and
Yt ⊆ Q˜+(Xt), t = 2, 3, 4;
Y6 ⊆ Q˜+(X6) ∪ Q˜+(M\X).
Hence W ∩ X = ∅ and W ∩ Yt = ∅ (t = 2, . . . , 6). Since Q˜+(i) ∩ Q˜+(j) = ∅
for any i 6= j (definition of A˜) and Q˜+(i) ∩M ′ = ∅ for any i (Observation 3),
noticing that Y1 = W1 ⊆W\X (Lemma 6), we conclude that
Yt ∩X = ∅ and Yt ∩ Ys = ∅, s 6= t, s, t ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. (17)
6 Establishment of Strong Stability
Now we are ready to go back to proving (7) and hence Theorem 1. Since
X2 ⊆M33 , the left-hand side of inequality (7) is at most
|X| − 1
2
|M33 | ≤
6∑
t=1
|Xt| − 1
2
|X2|. (18)
On the other hand, if we let
Y ′t := {i ∈ Yt : bi = 1} and Y ′′t := Yt\Y ′t , for t = 2, 3, 4, 6,
which imply
Y ′′4 = {i ∈ Y4 : bi ≥ 2, ai ≥ bi + 2} ⊆
⋃
2≤b≤a−2
M ba,⋃
t∈{2,3,4,6}
Y ′t ∪ Y1 ∪ Y5 ⊆
⋃
a≥2
M1a ,⋃
t∈{2,3,6}
Y ′′t ⊆
⋃
2≤b<a
M ba,
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then noticing the properties (17) and that
b− 4b− 5
a− 1 ≥
{
1
2 , if 2 ≤ b < a;
1, if 2 ≤ b ≤ a− 2,
we see that the right-hand side of inequality (7) is at least
|Y1|+ |Y5|+
∑
t∈{2,3,4,6}
|Y ′t |+
1
2
∑
t∈{2,3,6}
|Y ′′t |+ |Y ′′4 |
≥ |Y1|+ 1
2
|Y2|+ 1
2
|Y3|+ |Y4|+ |Y5|+ 1
2
|Y6|. (19)
According to Lemmas 7–11 and Corollary 15, the right-hand side of inequality
(18) is at most that of (19), which in turn ultimately leads to inequality (7).
Consequently, Theorem 1 is established.
From Theorem 1 and the lower bound demonstrated in Section 2.1, the
following theorem follows.
Theorem 2 In the m-server load balancing game (m ≥ 3), any NE is a (5/4)-
approximate SNE and the bound is tight.
7 Concluding Remarks
By establishing a tight bound of 5/4 for the approximation of general NEs
to SNEs in the m-server load balancing game for m ≥ 3, we have closed the
final gap for the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs. However,
as demonstrated by Feldman & Tamir [7] and by Chen [4], a special subset of
NEs known as LPT assignments, which can be easily identified as NEs [9], do
approximate SNEs better than general NEs. It is still a challenge to provide a
tight approximation bound for this subset of NEs.
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